The answer to this clearly depends on the recorded results of the clinical examination, and the issue may then be whether that examination has been sufficiently thorough. This would place the emphasis where it belongs in medical traditionupon the history-taking and examination.
The remedy for the present crisis in radiologyif that is not too strong a termin my view rests largely in the hands of the medical profession.
The law will ask the right questions if the criteria for radiography are changed in the way I have indicated. If it becomes impossible for an expert witness to say that the normal practice would have been to request radiology, and he becomes obliged to say that the clinical findings would dictate the course of action, the question must then mQve to the clinical examination and the junior doctor will then quite properly concentrate his fears upon failing to do a thorough examination rather than failing to request an X-ray.
It is up to the senior members of the profession not only to set an example in this matter, but also to resist the temptation to give evidence for a plaintiff which does not accord with the principles which I have outlined. Legal representatives trying to establish a case can be very persuasive and the 'accepted procedure' method of proof is much easier for them to establish than the 'clinically necessary'.
Finally, I think that the Royal Colleges could play an active part in protecting standards of practice within their own fields by establishing separate committeesor better still, a joint committeeto consider the evidence given in actions for negligence and determine whether it is truly representative of the best standards of practice. Indeed I would go further and suggest that such a committee should be available for consultation by either party to such an action before the hearing, and be prepared to send a representative to the hearing to give expert evidence.
If properly interpreted and applied, the law does not expect the profession to depart from its own standards. The profession sets the standards and gives evidence of what they are.
To sum up -let us condemn and abandon the routine X-ray and let those who are called upon to give evidence in the courts stress the true purpose of radiology as an adjunct to clinical examination used only when it is seen to be necessary at the time, and not in retrospect. We cannot help those who omit it in the face of an obvious need, but the law is on the side of those who, after a careful examination, reasonably decide that it is not necessary, even if later proved by events to have been wrong.
Mr G H J Bovell (Le Brasseur & Oakley, London WClB3BZ)
Medicolegal Aspects I start from the very obvious and rather trite proposition that whether or not to request an X-ray is essentially a clinical decision. It is a question into which a lawyer should not intrude, because what a doctor considers to be medically right for his patient must prevail over purely medicolegal considerations. A doctor who is unduly preoccupied with possible legal consequences may be likened to a golfer who lifts his head at the-crucial moment.
Speaking for myself, although I hope that most lawyers would agree with me, I accept entirely the order of priority which puts the proper treatment of the patient first and the avoidance of the risk of litigation last. But I agree with Dr France that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive and need not be in conflict. More often they point in exactly the same direction. The best and most effective form of defensive medicine is, surely, to exercise the standard of skill and care which the law requires of a medical practitioner. That will not guarantee immunity against being sued by a litigious patient, but it should ensure that, if a claim is made, it will not be upheld.
One can sympathize with radiologists who feel that too many demands are being made upon them and their departments by requests for X-rays which they regard as unnecessary. And I do not doubt that, from excessive caution or lack of confidence or some other motive, casualty officers may often be tempted to pass the buck, both clinically and legally, on to the radiologist. I should, however, like to put in a plea in mitigation on behalf of casualty officers, because if they do err on the side of caution I am not sure that they can fairly be criticized for it.
Leaving aside mere tactical legal considerations it is, I think, agreed that the patient must come first. I do not suppose that any statistical comparison would be possible but when one is considering the cost of radiological services, as in the figures which emerge from the research at St George's Hospital, should one not also take some account of the additional discomfort and inconvenience which the patient will suffer, and perhaps the waste of his time and loss of earnings through longer absence from his work, if he is sent home with *an undiagnosed fracture or harbouring a foreign body?
If a casualty officer has taken a careful history, made a thorough examination and found no evidence of a likely fracture or foreign body, and Section of Radiology in the exercise of a careful and proper clinical judgment he sees no indication for an X-ray, is he then legally at risk in failing to make 100% sure by ordering an X-ray? In principle the answer is no, he is not at risk. For he would appear to have acted reasonably and conscientiously. All the law requires of him is reasonable skill, care and competence, not the expertise of a consultant in a Harley Street consulting room. So if it is subsequently discovered that the patient was discharged with an undetected fracture or foreign body, and a claim is made alleging negligence in failing to X-ray on the patient's first attendance at the accident department, the defence or protection society representing the doctor involved does not automatically hoist the white flag. The law does not define the circumstances in which an X-ray ought to be taken, or need not be taken. As Dr France has said, each case has to be determined on its merits according to the evidence and expert opinion as to what in those particular circumstances is or is not acceptable medical practice. I can only say, with Dr France, that when we have to defend this kind of claim and the case is put to an expert for his opinion, we are often advised that on this history and on these findings on examination an X-ray ought to have been taken, and the expert feels unable to support in the witness box the failure to do so. It is not that the lawyers advise that an X-ray is mandatory, but rather that when it comes to the crunch orthopwedic opinion does often seem to lean in support of X-raying.
If, therefore, the word should get around that in injury cases it is more prudent to play safe and request an X-ray, I would suggest that the request which turns out, with hindsight, to have been unnecessary may have been justified: not just from the narrow legal point of view of avoiding litigation, but because the patient is the first priority and may be entitled to the benefit of further investigation either to confirm or to eliminate suspicion of a fracture.
I have dwelt a little on injury cases because they are one of the most prolific sources of claims. There is the other type of case where an X-ray may be not just unnecessary but positively contraindicated because of the risk of harmful radiation. I suppose that this concerns the radiologist primarily, though not exclusively, in relation to pregnant women or women who may be in the early stage of a pregnancy not yet ascertained. As medical and legal opinion is now paying increasing attention to the question of injury to the unborn child, I should like to say something about the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Bill which is now in the course of its passage through Parliament. It has government support, so we can assume that it will become law.
If it is passed substantially in its present form it should not, and I hope will not, cause the medical profession any undue anxiety or make doctors over-anxious about treating women in their childbearing years.
The Bill gives an independent right of action to a child who is born disabled as the result of a wrongful act to his parent which impaired the ability of the parent to have a normal healthy child, or which affected the mother during her pregnancy or in the course of the child's birth so that the child is born with disabilities which would not otherwise have been present.
I emphasize 'wrongful act to his parent'not wrongful act to a child yet unborn or not yet conceived. It is thus an essential prerequisite of an action by the child that the disability for which he claims damages must have been caused by some negligent or other wrongful act towards his parent before he was born or during the course of his birth. The Bill does not, of course, relate only to medical treatment. It covers any occurrence which causes a congenital disability, such as a motor accident, accident at work, assault (e.g. wife battering) for which someone would be legally liable to the injured parent. Actionable negligence consists of the breach of a duty of care owed by one person to another person in consequence of which that other person suffers damage. At present the law does not recognize a duty of care towards an unborn child, and the Congenital Disabilities Bill does nothing to change that. It does not impose upon a doctor who is treating a prospective parent any additional or iindependent duty of care towards an unborn child which might conflict with the duty the doctor owes to the parent.
In a climate of social and political opinion which seems to be increasingly in favour of giving legal redress to children who are born disabled, the Bill is more conservative than might have been expected. Its main innovations are:
(1) A chil(i can recovet damages for a negligent act towarcis another person (his parent) without proving thlat there was any duty of care owed to himself.
(2) A child can recover damages for negligence to his parent, even though the parent has suffered no damage.
(3) A child can recover damages for negligence to his parent even though an action by the parent for that negligence would be statute barred because it had nolt been brought within the legal time limit.
The standard of skill and care required in treating a woman of child-bearing age will thus remain as it is nowN, irrespective of the Bill. If a child should be born disabled as the result of any medical treatment of his mother before his birth, it must be asked whether the doctor would be liable to the mother for negligence, judged by the present criteria of reasonable skill and care. Only if the answer is yes will the child recover damages.
In addition to the onus placed upon the child to prove that his disability was caused by a wrongful act to his parent, the Bill also provides two specific defences. The first is that there is no liability if, before conception, the particular risk of the child being born disabled was known to the parents. The second is that a professional man will not be liable for treatment or advice given according to prevailing standards of care. And damages recoverable by the child may also be reduced by the contributory negligence of the parent. The number of children who will be able to bring successful actiions for damages is likely to be very small, so there is no need to fear that the Bill when it becornes law will produce a flood of claims for prenatal injury.
Mr Anthony Barker (St George's Hosp.)ital, London SWJ7) spoke as a casualty consultant with a team of 6 Senior House Officers who were offering a 24-hour service. They were often at an early stage of their graduate training, and some were not British trained at all. He did not feel that they could be asked to take fewer X-rays, but had a real concern for the number of films that were taken, of which the majority were normal.
Dr Barker suggested that saving could be affected by concentrating on the appropriate views, instancing that knobkerrie head wounds in the Zulu patients whom he had formerly served did not merit a complete skull series, but a tangential view to determine depression of the bone.
He was in favour of saving, in the manner suggested by Dr de Lacey, by not storing normal films after reporting. This would clearly reduce the cost of the service and not threaten, medically, the patient's safety.
Dr Ian Kelsey Fry (St Bartholomew's Hospital, London, ECIA 7BE), in response to a question, said hewas disturbed by any argument suggesting that an investigation which, in a given clinical situation, provided significant information in only a small proportion of cases was, therefore, not worth doing. If say, only 2 , of intravenous urograms in patients with hypertension were important to management, then one would have to be extremely careful before deciding when IVUs should not be done in such patients. It might not be cost-effective, but without it one might not be able to say the patient had been given the best possible care. The main problem was to collaborate with clinical colleagues in defining precise objectives for each investigation.
Dr P M Bretland (Whittington Hospital, London NJ9) said that at his hospital, whose annual budget approached £8 500 000, the annual film bill was about £29 000, about a quarter being for accident and emergency cases. Small reductions in the numbers of films taken would have very little effect on the total expenditure. He felt that, while the profession had to put its own house in order to ensure X-rays were taken only when indicated, the radiologists should beware of the dangers of assuming the administrative role. It was for the profession to say what was required for the proper management of the patient and to invite the administration to provide it.
